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Abstract – Energy and climate policies are usually seen as measures to internalize externalities. However, as a side 
effect, the introduction of these policies redistributes wealth between consumers and producers, and within these 
groups. While redistribution is seldom the focus of the academic literature in energy economics, it plays a central 
role in public debates and policy decisions. This paper compares the distributional effects of two major electricity 
policies: support schemes for renewable energy sources, and CO2 pricing. We find that the redistribution effects of 
both policies are large, and they work in opposed directions. While renewables support transfers wealth from 
producers to consumers, carbon pricing does the opposite. More specifically, we show that moderate amounts of 
wind subsidies can increase consumer surplus, even if consumers bear the subsidy costs. CO2 pricing, in contrast, 
increases aggregated producer surplus, even without free allocation of emission allowances; however, not all types 
of producers benefit. These findings are derived from an analytical model of electricity markets, and a calibrated 
numerical model of Northwestern Europe. Our findings imply that if policy makers want to avoid large 
redistribution they might prefer a mix of policies, even if CO2 pricing alone is the first-best climate policy in terms 
of allocative efficiency. 
 
 CO2 pricing and renewables support have strikingly different impacts on rents 
 Carbon pricing increases producer surplus and decreases consumer surplus 
 Renewable support schemes (portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs) do the opposite 
 We model these impacts theoretically and quantify them for Europe 
 Redistribution of wealth is found to be significant in size 
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1. Introduction 
Two of the major new policies that have been implemented in European, American, 
and other power markets during the last years are support for renewable energy 
generators and CO2 pricing. Many countries have introduced support schemes for 
renewable electricity, such as feed-in-tariffs or renewable portfolio standards. As a 
consequence, the share of renewables in electricity generation has been growing 
rapidly (REN21 2013; OECD/IEA 2013). In the European Union, it increased from 
13% in 1997 to 17% in 2008, in Germany, from 4% to 23% within the last two 
decades. According to official targets, the share of renewables in EU electricity 
consumption shall reach 60-80% by 2050. The second major policy was the 
introduction of a price for CO2. In Europe CO2 pricing was implemented via an 
emission trading scheme in 2005, and several countries, regions, and states have 
followed. During the last eight years, the European carbon price has fluctuated 
between zero and 30 €/t, with official expectations of prices between 100 €/t and 300 
€/t by 2050.1 
These new policies affect the profits of previously-existing (incumbent) electricity 
generators. More general, they redistribute economic surplus between producers and 
consumers and between different types of producers and consumers. Support policies 
bring renewable capacity in the market that decreases the wholesale electricity price 
below the level it would have been otherwise. For example, wind power has low 
variable costs and reduces the wholesale electricity price whenever it is windy. Lower 
electricity prices reduce the profits of existing generators and increase consumer 
surplus. If subsidy costs are passed on to consumers, the net effect on consumer 
surplus is ambiguous a priori. 
CO2 pricing increases the variable costs of carbon-emitting plants. Whenever such 
generators are price-setting, CO2 pricing increases the electricity price. Low-carbon 
plants like nuclear and hydro power benefit from higher prices without having to pay 
for emission. Carbon-intensive generators like lignite, in contrast, see their profits 
reduced because costs increase more than revenues. Consumer surplus is reduced due 
to higher electricity prices, and increased if they receive the income from CO2 
revenues. Again the net effect on consumers is ambiguous. 
Policy can impact producer rents only in the short term. In the long-term equilibrium, 
assuming perfect and complete markets, profits are always zero. Only if a market 
features some sort of inertia, and newly introduced policies are not fully anticipated, 
the policy impacts profits. We believe power markets to fulfill these two conditions. 
In this paper, we model and quantify the redistribution effects of renewable support 
policies and CO2 pricing, using an analytical (theoretical) and the numerical 
(empirical) model EMMA. We distinguish two sectors: incumbent generators with 
sunk investments, and electricity consumers. State revenues and expenditures are 
assumed to be passed on to consumers as lump-sum payments. Generators are further 
distinguished by technology, since the effect of CO2 pricing on generators depends on 
their carbon intensity and the effect of renewable subsidies depends on their capital 
intensity. Disaggregating consumers could yield important insights, but is beyond the 
scope of this paper (see for example Neuhoff et al. 2013). Markets are assumed to be 
competitive, thus profits are zero in the long term. The modeling approach is valid for 
different types of CO2 pricing (emission trading, carbon tax) and different types of 
                                                 
1 2050 targets are taken from the Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission 2011). 
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renewables support (feed-in tariffs, renewable portfolio standards with or without 
certificate trading, investment grants, tax credits) and is in this sense very general. We 
use wind power as an example for a subsidized renewable electricity source, but all 
arguments apply to solar power and other zero marginal-cost technologies as well. 
In our quantitative assessment of Northwestern Europe we find that the redistribution 
effects of both policies are large. Overall, wind support distributes surplus from 
producers to consumers and carbon pricing does the opposite. Wind support transfers 
enough producer rents to consumers to make those better off even if they pay the 
costs of subsidies. Wind support reduces the profits of base load generators more than 
those of peak load generators. CO2 pricing reduces the profits of coal-fired generators, 
leaves those of gas plants largely unaffected, and increasing the rents of nuclear plants 
dramatically. As a group, electricity generators benefit from carbon pricing even 
without free allocation of emission permits. 
We acknowledge that power markets feature a number of externalities that we ignore 
in this study. While CO2 pricing has the clear objective of internalizing the costs of 
climate change, policy makers have put forward a multitude of motivations for 
renewable support. This paper does not assess these motivations, does not take into 
account externalities, and does not provide a cost-benefit analysis of these two 
policies or evaluates them against each other. Rather, our goal is merely to point out 
their peculiar effects regarding the redistribution of wealth. We focus here on the 
impact of two policies separately, and the joint impact. Interactions with existing or 
new policies, such as energy efficiency, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
The next section reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the analytical framework 
and introduces the models. Section 4 discusses the effects of wind support, section 5 
those of carbon pricing, and section 6 the compound effects of both policies. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Redistributive impacts of climate and energy policy have become a major topic in 
economics research during the last years. Redistributive flows between jurisdiction, 
between generations, and between resource owners vs. resource consumers have 
received much attention; see for example Bauer et al. (2013) on resource owners. 
Edenhofer et al. (2013) provides a broader survey of the issue. This paper adds to this 
literature by analyzing redistribution between firms and consumers via the electricity 
market. 
Focusing on the narrower field of electricity policies, the present paper builds on three 
branches of the literature on implications of policy instruments: the “merit-order” 
literature, the “windfall profit” literature, and the “policy interaction” literature. The 
first branch focuses on the depressing effect of renewables generation on the 
electricity price, which has been termed “merit-order effect”. The second branch 
discusses the impact of carbon pricing on consumer and producer surplus, where 
increasing producer rents are sometimes labeled “windfall profits”. The third branch 
discusses the interaction between these two policies. 
Attracting additional investments in (renewable) generation capacity depresses the 
electricity price below the level it would have been otherwise. Because the size of the 
drop depends on the shape of the merit-order curve, Sensfuß (2007) has termed this 
the “merit-order effect”. A number of papers model the price impact theoretically and 
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numerically. Modeling exercises for the Nordic countries (Unger and Ahlgren 2005), 
Germany (Sensfuß, Ragwitz, and Genoese 2008) and Spain (de Miera, Gonzalez, and 
Vizcaino 2008) indicate that the additional supply of electricity from wind power 
reduces the spot price so much that consumers are better off even if they have to bear 
the subsidy costs. Results for Denmark are less conclusive (Munksgaard and 
Morthorst 2008). Based on a theoretical model, Fischer (2010) finds that the sign of 
the price impact depends on the relative elasticity of supply of fossil and renewable 
generation. MacCormack et al. (2010) find the merit-order effect to be larger when 
conventional generators have more market power because both the additional supply 
and the uncertainty introduced by wind power reduce the incentive to withhold 
capacity. While these studies apply numerical models, O’Mahoney and Denny (2011) 
and Gil, Gomez-Quiles, and Riquelme (2012) use regression analyses. Confirming 
model results, they find that both in Ireland and Spain the merit-order effect 
outweighs the subsidy costs for consumers. Mount et al. (2012) stresses the effect on 
producer profits and the “missing money” to finance capital costs from short-term 
profits. Wissen and Nicolosi (2008) and MacCormack et al. (2010) emphasize that the 
merit-order effect is only a short-term or “transient” phenomenon, since in the long-
term equilibrium prices need to include capital costs. While the literature has 
collected an impressive amount of evidence, most of these papers are not explicit that 
the price is reduced by redistributing wealth from incumbent producers to consumers, 
and none accounts comprehensively for all redistribution and efficiency effects. 
The second branch of literature deals with the redistribution effects of carbon taxes 
and emission trading schemes. Most of these studies are written in the context of 
discussions of different allocation rules for emission allowances. Typically, they 
model the impact of allocation rules on profits, and to what extent CO2 costs can be 
passed through to consumers. A well-known result is that in the case of 
grandfathering large windfall profits for producers occur that are paid by consumers, 
for example reported by Bode (2006) and Sijm et al. (2006). Some authors find that 
the aggregated power generation sector benefits even if allowances are fully 
auctioned. This is shown for the UK (Martinez and Neuhoff 2005) and for 
Northwestern Europe (Chen et al. 2008). Similarly, Burtraw et al. (2002) report for 
the US that only 9% of all allowances would need to be grandfathered to preserve 
total producer profits when introducing CO2 certificates. In addition, Burtraw and 
Palmer (2008) find that a number of US-electricity generators would benefit from 
emission trading even under full auctioning. 
Finally, there is an established branch of the literature that discusses the interaction 
between CO2 pricing and renewables support. It is found that these concurrent policies 
partly offset each other, in the sense that a more stringent renewable target reduces the 
CO2 prices, and a more stringent CO2 target reduces the prices of tradable green 
certificates (Unger and Ahlgren 2005, Tsao et al. 2011). A perverse consequence is 
that more renewable support increases the supply of the most emission-intensive 
generators (Böhringer and Rosendahl 2010). Because of lower allowance prices, wind 
support decreases electricity prices not only via the power market, but also via the 
carbon market (Rathmann 2007). These publications focus on certificate markets, but 
do not compare both policies regarding their effect on the power market. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that comprehensively and 
consistently models and compares the redistribution effects of renewables support and 
CO2 pricing. While previous studies do report effects on prices and sometimes on 
profits, they do not report consumer and producer surplus. We comprehensively 
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account for all redistributive flows between actors such that they consistently add up. 
A newly developed framework that uses the long-term equilibrium as a benchmark is 
used to evaluate both policies consistently. This innovation is the main contribution to 
the literature. 
Furthermore, combining an analytical with a numerical model allows us tracing the 
causal mechanisms as well as providing quantitative estimates where theoretical 
results are ambiguous. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide 
an analytical model of redistribution via the electricity market. In addition, we allow 
for endogenous investment, a key gap in the literature identified by Tsao et al. (2011). 
Finally, our numerical power market model takes into account a large number of 
technical side constraints and the intermittent character of wind power. This is crucial 
not only for quantifications, but also to understand the different impact on types of 
generating technologies. 
3. Methodology 
This section introduces the two models and outlines the framework in which we apply 
both models. The analytical model is meant to generate insights into the causal 
mechanisms of policy-induced redistribution effects. The numerical model EMMA 
quantifies redistribution flows for Northwestern European countries and provides 
results where analytical findings are ambiguous. Both models are applied within the 
same consistent framework that uses the long-term equilibrium as a starting point to 
compare the short-term impacts of both policies. 
3.1. Framework 
In a long-term equilibrium (LTE) on perfect and complete markets with free entry, 
profits (rents, producer surplus) are zero.2 If a market features some sort of inertia and 
newly introduced policies are not fully anticipated, a policy shock displaces the 
system from its LTE. Only during the transition towards a new LTE the policy might 
change profits and thereby redistribute producer surplus to or from other actors. As 
MacCormack et al. (2010) put it, redistribution of producer surplus is a “transient 
phenomenon” that vanishes once the system has converged to the new LTE. In the 
power market, inertia is substantial due to long life times and building times of power 
plants and other infrastructure. 
In this paper, we distinguish two time perspectives with corresponding market 
equilibriums: the “long term” and the “short term”. In the long term, the amount and 
type of capacity is a choice variable that is decided upon by producers (“green field” 
model). In the short term, producers take the existing capital stock as given at zero 
costs (but are allowed to additionally invest). In both the long and the short term, 
producers face production decisions.3 In other words, in the long term no capital stock 
is given while in the short term there is a stock of sunk investments. While long-term 
profits are zero in the LTE, short-term profits are positive in the short-term 
equilibrium (STE). Short-term profits are needed to repay capital costs. This is 
possible because there is no free entry that could drive down short-term profits to 
                                                 
2 Positive long-term profits would attract new investments that drive down prices to the point where profits disappear. Vice 
versa, negative profits would lead to disinvestment, driving up prices until negative profits vanish. 
3 Note that according to this definition, the capital stock is not fixed in the short term, but additional investments are possible. 
Others (Hirth 2012, MacCormack et al. 2010) have labelled this the “medium term” and apply the term “short term” to a situation 
where the capital stock is fixed without the possibility of additional investments. 
 6 
 
zero, since entrants had to build new capacity and pay the corresponding capital 
expenditures. In other words, in the STE previously-existing generators are able to 
extract rents from their sunk investments, which are used to finance capital costs. 
While both long term and short term are analytical concepts that never describe a real 
market entirely correctly, we believe the short term as defined here is a useful 
assumption to analyze moderate shocks to European power systems on a time horizon 
of 3 to 15 years. 
In this research project, we exploit these two concepts to construct a framework that 
allows comparing the distribution effect of different policies consistently (Figure 1). 
We assume that the power market is in its LTE before policies are introduced. Then 
we switch perspective and derive the STE by taking the previously derived capacity 
as given. Then a policy is introduced exogenously and unexpectedly that shifts the 
system to a new STE. We define the redistributive effect of that policy as the 
difference of short-term profits and consumer surplus between these two STEs. To 
compare two policies, they are independently introduced starting from the same STE, 
and the redistribution effects of the policies are consequently compared. Income from 
scarcity pricing is assumed to remain constant, for example due to capacity payments. 
The new LTE that would emerge after some time is not of interest for this paper. This 
framework features two properties that are necessary to compare redistribution effects 
of different policies: 
1. The same benchmark is used for both policies. 
2. All changes in short-term rents are strictly caused by policy changes. 
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Figure 1: This framework allows to consistently studying different policies with an analytical and a 
numerical model. Starting from a long-term equilibrium with no policy, two short-term equilibriums (STE) 
are compared: the STE prior to policy with a STE with a newly introduced policy. 
While deriving the long-term equilibrium is a standard methodology in the power 
economics literature, using the resulting capacity mix to evaluate policies in a short-
term equilibrium is to our knowledge a novel approach, which we regard as 
significant innovation. An alternative to our short term / long term dichotomy is to 
disregard adjustments of the capital stock, potentially overestimating the impact of 
policies (Sensfuß et al. 2008, Chen et al. 2008, Böhringer and Rosendahl 2010, Tsao 
et al. 2011). Another alternative is to model the system’s adaptation to shocks 
dynamically over time (Prognos AG et al. 2010, Short et al. 2011, Nicolosi 2012, 
Färber et al. 2012). However, such scenario analysis typically features a multitude of 
dynamic shocks that makes it very hard to identify the effect of a specific policy. 
Consequently, this scenario literature does not provide results of the distributional 
impact of individual policies. More fundamentally, the starting points of these studies 
are usually chosen in a way that the market is off its equilibrium in the first place, 
meaning that changes in rents are not only caused by policy changes, but simply by 
adjustment process towards the equilibrium. While the scenario literature can provide 
projection of rents, it is not helpful to disentangle individual drivers and evaluate 
specific policies. 
3.2. Analytical Model 
This subsection introduces a stylized cost-minimizing analytical model of the 
electricity market and derives the LTE and the STE. We show that long-term profits 
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are zero while in the STE producers are able to extract short-term rents from their 
sunk investment. Policies are assessed in sections 4.1 and 5.1. 
To develop a qualitative understanding of major effects it is sufficient to model two 
generation technologies, which we label “gas” and “coal” power. Dynamic aspects 
like ramping constraints and electricity storage are neglected, as well as heat and 
reserve market requirements, international trade, and grid constraints. These details 
are taken into account in the numerical model (section 3.3). Both models assume fully 
competitive and complete markets with perfect foresight. Hence, the cost-minimizing 
solution is equivalent to the market equilibrium. Electricity demand is perfectly price-
inelastic. All fees and taxes are assumed to be specific and remain constant. 
Externalities are assumed to be absent. 
We extend a classical method from power economics (Stoughton et al. 1980, Grubb 
1991, Stoft 2002, Green 2005) that uses screening curves, a load duration curve4 
(LDC), and a price duration curves (PDC) that is derived from the first two (Figure 
2a, b, c). A screening curve represents the total costs per kW-year of one generation 
technology as a function of its full load hours. Its y-intercept is the annuity of 
investment costs and the slope equals the variable costs. The LDC shows the sorted 
hourly load of one year starting with the highest load hour. A price duration curve 
shows the sorted hourly prices of one year starting with the highest price. This model 
allows the representation of the two policies we aim to analyze: wind support5 
reshapes the LDC, while CO2 pricing pivots the screening curves. Before introducing 
policies in sections 4 and 5, the LTE and the STE are derived in the following. For a 
more detailed model description and an alternative application see Ueckerdt et al. 
(2012). 
 
                                                 
4 For the illustrations we use hourly data for German power demand in 2009 (ENTSO-E). 
5 We use quarter hourly feed-in data from German TSOs for 2009. 
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Figure 2: Long-term equilibrium (left) and short-term equilibrium (right) described by screening curves 
(a,d), load duration curve (b,e), and price duration curve (c,f). In the short term, screening curves do not 
contain investment costs and the price duration curve does not contain scarcity prices ps. 
We first derive the cost-minimal long-term capacity mix and dispatch, then show that 
profits for all plants are zero in the cost minimum, and finally explain that this is the 
unique market equilibrium. Cost-minimal capacities and generation can be derived by 
projecting the intercepts of the screening curves on the LDC. The LDC is then 
horizontally divided. Each part of load is covered by the technology with the least-
cost screening curve for the respective range of full load hours. Gas power plants are 
cost effective at lower full load hours (peak load) due to their low fixed-to-variable-
cost ratio. Coal power plants cover base load. Hereby optimal capacities and dispatch 
of plants are determined. The PDC is derived from the equilibrium condition that the 
price equals the variable costs of the marginal plant, except in the one hour of the year 
when capacity is scarce. In this peak hour scarcity prices 𝑝𝑠 occur. 
We now show that gas plants earn zero profit. Unless capacity is scarce, the electricity 
price is set by the variable costs of the marginal plant. Hence, operating gas plants are 
always price-setting (Figure 2c). To recover capital costs, gas plants need to demand a 
scarcity price 𝑝𝑠. Under perfectly inelastic demand, this is only possible in exactly one 
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hour of the year, since at any other point in time there is some capacity available that 
would supply electricity if the price would rise above variable costs. 
𝑝𝑠 = 𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠 + ∆ 
∆= 𝐼𝑔𝑎𝑠 
(1)  
(2)   
The markup ∆ on specific (per MWh) variable costs  can only be chosen to 
exactly cover the investment specific (per MW) cost . A gas power plant cannot 
further increase the scarcity price to make profit because other gas power plants 
would enter the market and bid lower prices until the rent vanishes. Hence, the 
scarcity price implies zero profits for gas power plants. 
We now show that for the optimal capacity mix the scarcity price leads to zero profits 
also for coal power plants. At the intersection of the screening curves in Figure 2a it 
holds: 
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑇1 + 𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 = 𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑇1 + 𝐼𝑔𝑎𝑠 
⇔                     𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 = (𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙)𝑇1 + 𝐼𝑔𝑎𝑠 
(2)
⇒                     𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 = (𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙)𝑇1 + ∆ 
(3)  
(4)   
  
(5)   
The right hand side of the last equation is the annual income of one unit of coal 
capacity in the optimal capacity mix as indicated by the shaded area under the price 
duration curve (Figure 2c). Hence, market income exactly covers the specific 
investment costs of coal capacity if the capacity mix is cost-minimal. One scarcity 
price leads to zero profits for both gas and coal power plants at the optimal capacity 
mix. 
We now explain why this solution is the unique long-term market equilibrium. Let us 
assume the system’s capacities deviate from their optimal values. Substituting gas for 
coal capacity would increase the width of the shaded area in Figure 2c, resulting in 
profits for coal plants. Additional coal generators have an incentive to enter the 
market until profits vanish. Substituting coal for gas capacity would lead to negative 
profits and market exit. A decrease of total generation capacity would lead to profits 
via scarcity prices and subsequent market entry. An increase of total generation 
capacity would make scarcity pricing impossible, causing exit of suppliers. Thus the 
cost-minimal capacity mix and the corresponding PDC is the unique LTE. To 
conclude, in the long-term equilibrium load is covered at least costs and all power 
plants earn zero profits. This result can be generalized to more than two technologies. 
In the following we define short-term profits and show that they are positive in the 
STE, as defined in section 3.1. In the short term, capacities from the long-term 
equilibrium are given. Investment costs for those existing plants are sunk and hence 
short-term screening curves only contain variable costs and no investment costs 
(Figure 2d). Coal is the least-cost technology at all full load hour values; however, its 
capacity is limited. The optimal dispatch does not change compared to the long-term 
equilibrium. Total capacity is not scarce and thus there is no scarcity price (Figure 2f). 
We assume the “missing money” due to lacking scarcity prices is transferred to 
generators via other mechanisms, for example a capacity payment. Hence, gas plants 
sell electricity at marginal costs whenever they operate and do not earn any profits. 
On the other hand, coal power plants generate short-term profits when gas is price-
setting. The specific rent per MW (shaded area in Figure 2f) needs to be multiplied by 
the coal capacity 𝑞1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 to calculate the absolute short-term producer rent 𝑅1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙:  
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𝑅1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 = (𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙)𝑇1𝑞1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 (6)  
In contrast to the LTE, where profits are zero, in the short term some producers can 
extract short-term rents from their sunk investment. 
3.3. Numerical Model 
To relax some of the assumptions of the analytical model, the calibrated Northwestern 
European numerical electricity market model EMMA has been developed. As the 
analytical model, it is deterministic, has an hourly resolution, assumes perfect and 
complete markets and can be used to derive both the LTE and the STE. However, it 
provides more details, such as a wider set of generation technologies, electricity 
storage, and international trade, features a large set of technical constraints, and 
accounts for fixed O&M costs. These features are discussed briefly in the following 
paragraphs. Equations are discussed in Hirth (2012a) and the source code as well as 
input date are available under creative common license via Hirth (2013). 
Generation is modeled as seven discrete technologies with continuous capacity: one 
fluctuating renewable source with zero marginal cost and exogenous dispatch (wind), 
five thermal technologies with economic dispatch (nuclear, lignite, hard coal, 
combined cycle and open cycle gas turbines), and electricity storage (pumped hydro). 
Dispatchable plants produce when the price is above their variable cost. The 
electricity price is the shadow price of demand, which is the marginal cost of 
increasing demand in a certain hour. This guarantees that the prices in the long-run 
equilibrium are consistent with the zero-profit condition for generators. Investments 
in all generation technologies is possible, but in the short-term nuclear investments 
are disregarded due to their long implementation time. Fixed O&M costs are taken 
into account, such that existing plants might be decommissioned for economic reasons 
after a policy shock. 
In power systems, a large number of technical constraints affect the dispatch of plants. 
A few of the most important ones are implemented as side conditions in EMMA. A 
share of the thermal capacity is modeled as combined heat and power plants that sell 
heat as well as electricity. These plants are forced to run, even if prices are below their 
variable costs. Ancillary services such as regulating power are modeled as a spinning 
reserve requirement that forces dispatchable capacity equivalent to 20% of the yearly 
peak demand to be online at any point of time. While internal grid constraints are 
ignored, cross-border flows are limited by net transfer capacities. 
Demand as well as wind generation time series are based on empirical 2010 data. 
Using historical time series ensures that crucial correlations across space, over time, 
and between parameters are captured. The model is calibrated to Northwestern Europe 
and covers Germany, Belgium, Poland, The Netherlands, and France. The model is 
linear, written in GAMS and solved by Cplex. It has been back-tested with historical 
data and is able to replicate dispatch decisions as well as prices in a satisfactory 
manner. Cost and technical parameters are consistent with empirical data, and were 
chosen such that today’s capacity mix is roughly replicated in the long-term 
equilibrium (Figure 3). 
Both the analytical and the numerical model do not take into account internal grid 
investments and balancing power. Large-scale renewables deployment probably 
increases both grid and balancing costs (Hirth and Ziegenhagen 2013), which we do 
not account for. 
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Similar market models have been used by DeCarolis and Keith (2006), Doherty et al. 
(2006), Olsina et al. (2007),  Lamont (2008), Bushnell (2010), and Green and 
Vasilakos (2011) to numerically estimate long-term equilibriums of power markets. 
However, these authors do not discuss the short term nor distribution issues. 
 
Figure 3: Model long-term equilibrium capacity mix versus historical capacity mix in 2009 for the model 
region. The modeled LTE capacity mix resembles quite closely to the observed data. 
4. Wind Support 
This section presents analytical and numerical model results of the redistribution 
effects of wind support schemes. As explained in section 3.1, it is assumed that the 
electricity market is in its long-term equilibrium prior to the introduction of wind 
support, and effects take place in the short term. Distributional effects emerge because 
costs for the existing capital stock are regarded as sunk. Support policies are not 
modeled explicitly, but implicitly by exogenously increasing the amount of wind 
power. The costs of wind support are then calculated ex post as the gap between full 
costs and market income, assuming a perfect policy design that does not leave any 
rents to wind generators. 
Renewable support policies have the effect of pushing additional low-variable cost 
capacity into the market relative to the long-term equilibrium. As a consequence, 
wind power replaces high-variable cost gas power plants when it is windy. Hence, 
during some hours coal is setting the price instead of gas power plants that become 
extra-marginal. In those hours the electricity price is reduced. In all other hours the 
electricity price remains unchanged. This implies that wind support never increases 
short-term rents of any existing generators. The reduction of producer rents leads to 
gains in consumer surplus. In addition, consumers are assumed to bear the economic 
costs of wind subsidies. The net effect of wind support on consumer surplus is thus a 
priori ambiguous and depends on the relative size of redistribution of producer surplus 
to the costs of subsidizing wind power. 
 
4.1. Analytical Results 
Figure 4 compares the short-term equilibrium of the electricity market prior (left) and 
after (right) the introduction of wind power. The left hand side is identical to the right 
0%
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hand side of Figure 2. Additional wind capacity has no effect on the cost structure of 
dispatchable generators, thus the short-term screening curves do not change (a, d) and 
dispatchable capacity remains the same (capacity bars in c and d are identical). 
However, residual load (load net of wind generation) is reduced during windy hours, 
shifting the RLDC downwards (b, e). The RLDC also becomes steeper because load 
during the peak hour of the year remains virtually unchanged6. The amount of energy 
generated in dispatchable plants, the integral under the RLDC, is reduced. Thus full 
load hours of all dispatchable plants are reduced: existing capacity is utilized less – 
this is why Nicolosi (2012) calls the impact of wind on the RLDC the “utilization 
effect”. Most importantly, the PDC is shifted (c, f) to lower prices, because the 
number of hours where gas is price-setting is diminished.  
The effect of wind support on incumbent generators is determined by the shift of the 
PDC. The short-term rents of gas plants remain zero even though less energy is 
generated, because they are price-setting whenever they operate. In contrast, coal 
power plants earn profits when gas is price-setting. Hence, coal power plants lose 
because the number of hours when gas is price-setting is reduced. The reduction of 
coal rents equals the change of total producer rents. The dotted area in Figure 4f 
shows the loss of the specific (in € per MW) rent of coal capacity: (𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠 −
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙)(𝑇1 − 𝑇2). The absolute decrease of 𝑅1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 (in €) is given by the coal capacity 
𝑞1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 times the specific loss. 
𝑅1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 − 𝑅2
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 = 𝑞1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙(𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙)(𝑇1 − 𝑇2)  (7)  
The last factor depends on the deployment of renewable capacity while the others are 
constant: The shift of the PDC to lower prices drives redistribution due to renewable 
support. 
                                                 
6 This is the case when the renewable technology has a comparable small capacity credit like wind power in Europe. 
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Figure 4: Short-term screening curves, load duration curves, price duration curves without (left) and with 
wind support (right). Wind changes the residual load duration curve (b, e). Producer rents decrease with 
wind support (checkered area equals the reduction of specific coal rents). 
A strong analytical result is that the rents of incumbent generators never increase due 
to wind support policies. Rents of the base load technology (coal) decrease, while 
rents of the peak load technology (gas) remain unchanged. The total effect is 
proportional to the reduction of hours in which gas is price-setting. Consumer rents 
increase by that amount minus the costs of wind support. The net effect on consumer 
surplus is ambiguous. 
4.2. Numerical Results 
In the following, EMMA is used to derive additional details and quantifications in 
three directions. Firstly, redistribution flows are quantified and shown to be 
significant in size. Secondly, a wider set of dispatchable generation technologies is 
modeled, such that loosing and winning generators can be identified more 
specifically. Finally, the costs of optimal wind subsidies are estimated, and it is shown 
that for moderate amounts of wind power the net effect on consumer surplus is 
positive. 
 15 
 
In the long-term equilibrium wind is absent, thus all incumbent generators are 
conventional. Table 1 presents the changes in producer and consumer surplus caused 
by an exogenous increase of the wind share from zero to 30% of electricity 
consumption. Results are given per MWh of total annual consumption to facilitate 
comparison.7 Short-term rents of conventional generators are in average reduced by 
22 €/MWh. Nuclear rents almost vanish, coal rents are reduced by 80%, and gas rents 
by 70%. As indicated by the analytical model base load generators lose most, since 
their income is reduced during a relatively high share of hours. 
The effect on electricity consumers is displayed in Table 1b. Consumers save 28 
€/MWh in electricity expenditures, because 22 €/MWh are transferred from 
producers, and 6 €/MWh are saved due to lower fuel costs. On the other hand, 
consumers pay slightly more for heat, ancillary services, and grid fees. In addition, 
they have to bear the costs of incentivizing wind investments, which is 18 €/MWh. In 
sum, they receive a net benefit of 7 €/MWh. In other words, at 30% penetration rate 
the merit-order effect is larger than the cost increase due to wind subsidies. Despite 
wind power being inefficient, pushing it into the market reduces net consumer costs 
by transferring surplus from producers. This is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies (Unger and Ahlgren 2005, De Miera et al. 2008, Sensfuß et al. 2008, 
O’Mahoney and Denny 2011, Gil, Gomez-Quiles, and Riquelme 2012). 
System costs, the sum of negative surpluses, increase by 15 €/MWh (Table 1c). This 
is the net economic cost of wind power, ignoring all externalities.  
 
Incumbent Producers 
(€/MWh) 
Nuclear Rents - 13 
Coal Rents - 9 
Gas Rents - 1 
Producer Surplus - 22 
 
 
Consumers  
(€/MWh) 
Electricity market + 28 
Heat market - 2 
AS market - 0.1 
Interconnectors - 0.2 
CO2 taxes / 
Wind subsidies - 18 
Consumer Surplus + 7 
 
 
System Costs 
(€/MWh) 
Decrease in 
producers surplus 
22 
Increase in 
consumer surplus 
7 
Increase in system 
costs 
15 
 
Table 1a-c: Changes in short-term surplus of producers and consumers, and system costs changes when 
increasing wind penetration from zero to 30% (€/MWh). Previously existing generators lose, while gross 
benefits for consumers via the electricity price are larger than costs of subsidies, thus overall consumer surplus 
increases. 
 
The redistribution flows are economically highly significant: The surplus redistributed 
from producers to consumers due to wind subsidies is larger than the efficiency effect 
of this policy. Short-term profits are 30 €/MWh prior to the policy shock, thus they 
are reduced by more than 70%. Total long-term costs of electricity are 78 €/MWh, 
thus the loss in producer surplus is about 28% of total revenues of the industry. 
Figure 5 displays the costs of electricity supply and short-term producer rents at wind 
penetration rates between zero and 30%. While total costs of electricity supply 
                                                 
7 Thus results can be interpreted as normalized to a total electricity consumption of one MWh. 
 16 
 
increase when more wind capacity is added to the system, incumbents’ profits 
continuously fall. The latter effect is larger than the former, such that consumer 
expenditures are reduced. At a penetration rate of 10% consumers benefit the most. 
Prior to the policy shock, short-term rents were just sufficient to cover capital costs. 
Decreasing short-term producer rents are not sufficient to cover fixed costs (“missing 
money”). Conventional generators do not earn their expected rate of return, and might 
go bankrupt. Nonetheless, the “missing money” result does not imply that capacity 
payments are needed to restore allocative efficiency or secure supply. In our 
framework, energy-only markets with scarcity pricing provide sufficient incentives 
for new investments – it is only previously existing investments that are expropriated. 
 
 
Figure 5: Rents and costs at different wind penetration rates. Numbers label short-term producer rents 
(light green). The sum of the colored bars is consumer expenditure. With increasing wind penetration, 
producer rents are transferred to consumers. At 10% wind market share, short-term consumer surplus is 
maximal. 
Figure 6 shows how the price-setting technology shifts when adding more wind 
capacity to the system. This mechanism transfers producer rents to consumers via 
lower prices. As derived in section 4.1, the additional capacity causes generators with 
lower variable costs to set the price more often. Without wind, gas plants set the price 
in 50% of all hours, and hard coal during most of the remaining time. At 30% wind 
penetration, the price drops to zero in 10% of all hours, and in an additional 50% of 
the hours the base load technologies lignite and nuclear set the price. 
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Figure 6: Share of hours in which different technologies are price-setting. With higher wind penetration, the 
share of base load technologies increases. At 20% wind and above, prices drop to zero, when must-run 
constraints become binding. 
 
4.3. Findings and Discussion 
Several findings emerge from our analytical and numerical analysis of redistribution 
effects of wind support policies. Triggering significant amounts of wind investments 
will always reduce the electricity price. This implies a redistribution of surplus from 
incumbent generators to consumers. Thus wind support policies can be seen as a 
mechanism to transfer rents from producers to consumers. This is possible only if 
investments are sunk. Transfers are large relative to system cost effects and relative to 
other benchmarks. Base load generators lose relatively more than peak load 
generators. At moderate penetration rates (up to at least 30%) consumers benefit even 
if they pay the wind subsidies. Consumer surplus is maximized at around 10% wind 
share. Other types of renewables such as offshore wind power and solar power are 
more costly than onshore wind. Subsidizing those technologies could have a negative 
net effect on consumers, since the costs of subsidies might be larger than redistributed 
producer rents. 
5. CO2 Pricing 
This section presents analytical and numerical model results of the redistribution 
effects of carbon pricing. As in section 4, we do not model the carbon policy 
explicitly, but just its consequence: the existence of a CO2 price signal. The price of 
CO2 could be implemented via a price or a quantity instrument, both forms are 
equivalent in the present models. It is assumed that neither emission rights are 
allocated freely to emitters nor is there any other compensatory transfer to generators. 
Carbon pricing increases the variable costs of CO2-emitting plants. This increases the 
electricity price whenever these technologies are marginal generators. In all other 
hours, the electricity price remains unchanged. This implies that carbon pricing never 
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decreases the short-term rents of carbon-free generators, while the effect on emitting 
generators depends on their relative carbon intensity and their location in the merit 
order. The increase in average electricity price leads to losses in consumer surplus. 
However, consumers are assumed to receive the revenue from carbon pricing as a 
lump-sum transfer. The net effect of pricing carbon on consumer surplus is thus a 
priori ambiguous. 
 
5.1. Analytical Results 
In this subsection we will show that the net effect on producers as a whole depends on 
the initial generation mix and the CO2 price level. 
Figure 7 shows short-term screening curves for different CO2 prices. Figure 7a 
displays a price of zero and is identical to Figure 2b. With higher carbon prices, the 
variable costs of emitting technologies increase and thus the short-term screening 
curves pivot around their vertical intercepts. This effect induces changes of short-term 
profits. Six qualitatively different CO2 price regimes can be identified (a-f). 
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Figure 7: Short-term screening curves for coal and gas power plants. The CO2 price increases from Figure a 
to f, and thus the short-term screening curves pivot further around their vertical intercepts. Six 
qualitatively different CO2 price levels can be identified. 
(a) Without CO2 pricing costs and rents are (𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙)𝑇1𝑞1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 as derived in 
section 3. 
(b) An increasing CO2 price causes the screening curve of coal to pivot faster than the 
screening curve of gas. Coal rents decrease in proportion to the decreasing 
variable cost gap (𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙), while capacities as well as dispatch remain 
unchanged. 
(c) At a sufficiently high CO2 price, the two screening curves coincide.8 Capacities 
remain unchanged, and dispatch is arbitrary since both technologies feature 
                                                 
8 The short-term screening curves coincide at a carbon price of 65 €/t CO2, assuming fuel costs of 25 €/MWhth (gas) and 12 
€/MWhth (coal), efficiencies of 48% (gas) and 39% (coal), carbon intensities of 0,24 t/MWhth (gas) and 0,32 t/MWhth (coal). 
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identical variable costs. Total producer rents are zero because the price always 
equals the variable costs. 
(d) Further increasing the CO2 price increases the variable costs of coal above those 
of gas. The coal screening curve is steeper and above the gas curve. While 
capacities remain unchanged, now the dispatch changes (“dispatch fuel switch”): 
gas plants now cover base load. While coal plants do not earn any profits, gas 
plants generate rents when coal power plants are price-setting. 
(e) At an even higher CO2 price, the screening curve of coal touches the screening 
curve of new gas power plants even though the latter also contains investment 
costs.9 At this point, new base load gas is as expensive as old base load coal 
(“investment fuel switch”). The rents of gas power plants reach a maximum. 
(f) At higher CO2 prices, the end of the short-term coal screening curve lies above the 
long-term gas screening curve. Now, it is efficient to replace coal plants that 
operate with full load hours higher than 𝑇2 by new gas plants.
10 Only old gas 
plants generate rents. These rents remain at the level they reached in (e). This 
regime is further discussed in the remainder of this subsection and shown in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 8: Rents of gas and coal power plants change with increasing CO2 price. Six regimes (a-f) can be 
distinguished. Coal rents decrease to zero, while gas rents increase to a maximum level. The gas rents in 
regime (e) and (f) could be above or below the coal rents in (a), depending on the initial capacity mix (see 
result derived below). 
Figure 8 summarizes the development of short-term rents (in €) of coal and gas power 
plants when the carbon price increases. It illustrates that rents shift from coal power 
plants to gas power plants. The change of total producer rents (coal and gas) depends 
on the initial capacity mix of coal and gas, as we formally show later this section. 
In detail we discuss regime (f) because it includes a multitude of relevant policy-
induced effects. Figure 9 compares the short-term equilibrium of the electricity 
market prior (left) and after (right) the introduction of a carbon price. The short-term 
screening curves in Figure 9 (a, d) change according to the development illustrated in 
Figure 7f. Variable costs of coal are above those of gas, thus the coal screening curve 
is above the gas curve for existing plants. The dispatch is transposed: coal is shifted to 
peak load, existing gas power plants cover base load (Figure 9e). Coal rents vanish, 
while incumbent gas plants generate profits when coal is price-setting (Figure 9f). 
                                                 
9 This happens at about 80 €/t CO2, with the same efficiency assumptions and investment costs of 100€/kWa (gas). 
10 It is assumed that new gas power plants have the same costs and the same efficiencies as old ones. 
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Figure 9: Short-term screening curves, load duration curves, price duration curves without (left) and with 
CO2 pricing (right). Coal rents disappear, while gas rents appear. New gas power plants are built. 
Moreover investments in new gas power plants are profitable because screening 
curves of new gas power plants and existing coal power plants intersect (Figure 9d). 
All coal power plants that would operate at full load hours higher than 𝑇2 are 
replaced. The remaining coal power plants operate at lower full load hours. New gas 
plants are assumed to have the same efficiency parameters as old plants, thus the 
dispatch of old and new gas does not need to be distinguished. 
Hence all gas plants have the same specific income (in € per MW) indicated by the 
shaded area (Figure 9f): (𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑂2 − 𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠
𝐶𝑂2)𝑇2. The absolute rents (in €) of old gas are 
derived by multiplying with the old gas capacity: 
𝑅2
𝑔𝑎𝑠 = (𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑂2 − 𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠
𝐶𝑂2)𝑇2𝑞1
𝑔𝑎𝑠
 (8)  
𝑇2 is given by the intersection of new gas power plants and existing coal power plants 
intersect: 
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑂2𝑇2 = 𝑐𝑔𝑎𝑠
𝐶𝑂2𝑇2 + 𝐼𝑔𝑎𝑠 (9)  
When inserting this into equation 8 and it follows: 
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𝑅2
𝑔𝑎𝑠 = 𝐼𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑞1
𝑔𝑎𝑠
 (10)  
Total gas rents 𝑅2
𝑔𝑎𝑠
 depend only on the fixed costs of gas investments and their 
initial capacity. They do not further increase with growing CO2 price. This is one of 
our major analytical results. One MW of existing gas capacity receives short-term 
rents that exactly equal the costs of constructing new capacity. Thus the sunk nature 
of capital can be understood as entrance barrier that allows investors to generate 
profits.  
To calculate the total effect of carbon pricing on the total producer rents we need to 
calculate the coal rent before the policy. When the CO2 price is zero coal power plants 
earn their maximum rent 𝑅1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 this can be calculated by inserting equation 4 into 
equation 6: 
𝑅1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 = (𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 − 𝐼𝑔𝑎𝑠)𝑞1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 (11)  
Now we compare total producer rents (the sum of coal and gas plants), assuming 
realistically that coal plants are twice as capital intensive as gas plants (𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 = 2𝐼𝑔𝑎𝑠
). Thus from equations 10 and 11 it can be followed that the change in 
total producer rents (in €) depends only on the initial capacity mix: 
𝑅2
𝑔𝑎𝑠 − 𝑅1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 = 𝐼𝑔𝑎𝑠(𝑞1
𝑔𝑎𝑠 − 𝑞1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙) (12)  
If there is more low-carbon gas than carbon-intensive coal capacity in the initial mix 
the total producer rents will increase with high CO2 prices. This is a surprisingly 
simple condition and one of our main analytical model results. 
To conclude, increasing the CO2 price leads to redistribution flows between the two 
producers. The initial rents of coal power plants vanish. Rents of gas power plants 
occur after a certain threshold and increase up to a certain level that is determined by 
the rental capital costs of new gas plants. The resulting change of the total producer 
rents depends on the CO2 price and the initial mix of existing capacity. 
In this analytical model, it requires both very high CO2 prices and more initial gas 
than coal capacity to increase total producer rents. If we add a low-carbon base load 
technology like nuclear power to the model, it can be shown that CO2 pricing 
increases producer rents under a much wider set of parameters. While these results are 
not shown analytically due to space constraints, they are discussed in the following 
subsection. 
5.2. Numerical Results 
Table 2 presents the changes in producer and consumer surplus caused by an 
exogenous increase of the carbon price from zero to 100 €/t as modeled in EMMA. A 
CO2 price of 100 €/t has a similar system cost impact as supporting wind power to 
reach a market share of 30% and is in that sense a similarly “strong” policy 
intervention. The surprising result: despite full auctioning, overall short-term producer 
rents increase. This is one of our major numerical results. 
Nuclear power, while not being affected on the cost side, gains from increased 
electricity prices and can more than double short-term profits. On the other hand, coal 
plants lose most of their short-term profits. Gas rents increase their initially low 
profits by 15%. If large-scale new nuclear investments would be possible in the short 
run, nuclear profits would be limited by new investments. The finding that overall 
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producer rents increase is consistent with some previous studies, for example 
Martinez and Neuhoff (2005) and Chen et al. (2008). 
Consumers have to pay 43 €/MWh more for electricity, and have to bear higher costs 
for district heating, ancillary services, and grids as well. On the other hand, they 
receive a lump-sum carbon revenues of 20 €/MWh. Overall, consumer surplus is 
reduced by 29 €/MWh. System costs increase by 17 €/MWh. 
 
Incumbent Producers 
(€/MWh) 
Nuclear Rents + 21 
Coal Rents - 10 
Gas Rents + 0 
Producer Surplus + 12 
 
 
Consumers  
(€/MWh) 
Electricity market - 43 
Heat market - 6 
AS market - 0 
Interconnectors - 0 
CO2 taxes +20 
Wind subsidies / 
Consumer Surplus - 29 
 
 
System Costs 
(€/MWh) 
Increase in 
producer surplus 
12 
Decrease in 
consumer surplus 
29 
Increase in 
system costs 
17 
 
Table 2a-c: Changes in short-term surplus of producers and consumers, and system costs changes when 
increasing the CO2 price from zero to 100 €/t (€/MWh). Producers gain and consumers lose. 
 
As in the case of wind support, the transfers between economic actors due to carbon 
pricing are large in size. The surplus redistributed from consumers to producers is 
larger than the efficiency effect of this policy. Short-term profits are 30 €/MWh prior 
to the policy shock, thus they are increased by about 40%. In contrast to wind support 
and as indicated by the analytical model, carbon pricing also leads to massive 
redistribution between different generation technologies, from carbon intensive to 
low-carbon generators. According to our estimates, nuclear power plants more than 
double their profits. 
If emission allowances would be allocated freely to producers instead of being 
auctioned, this would increase producer rents by another 20 €/MWh. Thus the rents 
generated by increasing spot prices are of the same order of magnitude as the rents 
generated from entirely free allocation. This is surprising, since free allocation is 
widely discussed as a transfer mechanism, and the electricity market received much 
less attention in the public and academic debate. 
Not only a carbon price of 100 €/t, but also lower price cause significant transfers. 
Figure 10 displays the costs of electricity, suppliers’ expenditures for CO2, and short-
term producer rents at carbon prices between zero and 100 €/t. The sum of these three 
components equals consumer expenditure for electricity. Short-term producer rents 
increase continuously, driven by increased nuclear profits. Recall that the effect of 
CO2 pricing on total producer rents was found to be dependent on the initial capacity 
mix in section 5.1. Empirically, the increasing rents of low-carbon producers 
overcompensate for decreasing rents of carbon-intensive generators, because of the 
significant amount of installed nuclear power in the long-term equilibrium derived in 
section 3.3. In contrast to the effect of wind support consumer expenditures 
continuously increase even if revenues from the carbon market are transferred to the 
consumers. 
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Figure 10: Rents and costs at different CO2 prices. Numbers label short-term producer rents (light green). 
The sum of the colored bars is consumer expenditure, but CO2 expenditure of fossil plants (dark green) is 
recycled to consumers via lump-sum payments. Short-term rents increase with higher carbon prices over 
and above what is needed to recover capital costs (“windfall profits”).  
In contrast to wind support, carbon pricing has very different effects across countries: 
because of large existing nuclear capacity in France, producer rents double when 
introducing a CO2 price of 100 €/t. At the same time they remain constant in 
Germany, because of the large carbon-intensive incumbent lignite fleet. This 
dependency of the capital mix on the overall producer rents empirically confirms a 
qualitative result of the analytical model. 
Figure 11 compares the merit-order curve without a CO2 price with that at 100 €/t. 
The change in the merit-order curve is the fundamental reason for income transfers 
from consumers to producers via higher electricity prices. At high carbon prices, 
lignite plants would have higher variable costs than hard coal and CCGTs, but due to 
economic reasons they are decommissioned. The underlying reason for nuclear to 
increase short-term profits is that carbon pricing drives up the gap between nuclear 
and fossil plants. As in Figure 9f, the carbon price is high enough to incentivize new 
investments, in this case lignite CCS, CCGTs, and wind power. 
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Figure 11a-b: The merit-order curve of dispatchable plants without carbon pricing (left) and at 100 €/t CO2. 
The y-axis shows bidding price that takes into account start-up costs. 
5.3. Findings and Discussion 
The findings from modeling short-term effects of carbon pricing analytically and 
numerically can be summarized as follows. Even without free allocation of emission 
permits, pricing carbon can increase the surplus of electricity producers. If that is the 
case or not, depends on the initial capacity mix prior to the policy shock. Specifically, 
if the infra-marginal capacity is mainly low-emitting, producers as a whole benefit 
and consumers lose (via increasing electricity prices). If the infra-marginal capacity is 
mainly carbon intensive, producers lose and consumers can benefit (via tax or auction 
revenues).  
At realistic cost parameters and under the given European electricity mix, numerical 
model results show increasing overall producer rents at carbon prices of up to 100 €/t. 
Even at a moderate carbon price of 17 €/t, profits increase by almost 20% under full 
auctioning. Furthermore, this policy induces large transfers from carbon-intensive to 
low-carbon generators. The overall gain in producer surplus is large, in the same order 
of magnitude as the transfer due to free allocation of emission permits. Furthermore, 
the different initial capacity mixes in European countries lead to significant cross-
border transfers, the largest flowing from coal-intensive Germany to nuclear-intensive 
France. 
6. Policy Mix 
Comparing the two policy instruments with respect to their redistribution effect 
reveals a striking difference. While the system cost effect of each policy as well as the 
size of redistribution between consumers and producers is comparable in size, the 
directions of flows are opposite. CO2 pricing transfers economic surplus from 
consumers to producers while wind support does the opposite. Moreover, CO2 pricing 
leads to dramatic profit transfers from carbon-intensive to low-carbon producers, 
while wind support policies make all incumbent producers lose. 
It is plausible to assume that policy makers try to avoid transferring surplus to 
conventional generators. Indeed, during the last years there have been fierce debates 
on ”excessive returns“ and ”windfall profits” in the context of emission trading and 
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renewables support schemes in several countries. On the other hand, reducing 
generators’ short-term rents too much might leave them in a situation where they 
cannot pay back their sunk investments and go bankrupt, which might be undesirable 
from a policy maker’s perspective as well. Given that CO2 pricing increases producer 
rents and wind subsidies reduce them, a mix of both instruments allows mitigating 
CO2 emissions without changing conventional generators’ rents too much. Figure 12 
and Figure 13 display the compound effect of a mix of both policies. For example, 
introducing a CO2 price of 100 €/t and a wind target of 30% simultaneously leaves 
conventional rents virtually unchanged. 
 
 
Figure 12: Rents and costs with a mix of policies. The policy mix represents a path which leaves rents 
roughly unchanged. 
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Figure 13: Change in consumer rent, producer rent, and system costs due to wind support (30%), carbon 
pricing (100 €/t) and a combination of the two policies. A policy mix reduced the impact on profits virtually 
to zero. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper discusses wealth redistribution between producers and consumers caused 
by carbon pricing and renewable support via the electricity market. We have 
developed a framework to consistently evaluate both policies and have applied both a 
theoretical and an empirical model to it. 
We find that redistribution flows are large relative to the system cost impact of these 
policies. The two policies induce diametrically opposed redistribution flows: 
renewable support transfers rents from consumers to producers, while CO2 pricing 
does the opposite. In the case of renewables support, transfers are large enough to 
make consumers benefit from moderate levels of wind subsidies even if they pay for 
subsidies. Suppliers as a group benefit from carbon pricing, even if they pay for 
emission allowances, but there are large transfers from carbon intensive to low-carbon 
generators. 
In the economic literature on power markets and electricity policy, energy and climate 
policies have the primary purpose of internalizing external effects. Distributional 
consequences are seldom the focus of academic research and usually only briefly 
discussed in the literature. In real world policy making, in contrast, redistribution 
effects are often hotly debated. Given the size of transfers, we find, this is not 
surprising. 
Furthermore, our findings help explaining two stylized facts of energy policy: the 
attitude of certain actors towards specific policies, and the existence of a mix of 
policies in many countries. Our findings suggest that conventional generators should 
push for carbon pricing, while consumers should prefer renewable support. These 
attitudes can indeed be found in current European debates on energy policy. 
It is often found that carbon pricing is the first-best climate policy. The existence of 
renewable support policies is often explained with other externalities like learning 
spill-overs. We offer an alternative interpretation of this policy mix: undesirable 
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distributional consequences might prevent the implementation of carbon pricing alone 
and additionally require renewable support. Specifically, we show that combining 
carbon pricing with renewables support allows policy makers to keep producer rents 
unchanged. In general, understanding redistribution effects helps policy makers 
designing a policy mix that reduces implementation barriers. 
Future research could expand the analysis in five directions: First, redistribution 
between jurisdictions is important for policy making. This could be analyzed 
specifically in the context of heterogeneous national policies. Second, the interaction 
of redistributive effects of renewables support and CO2 pricing with existing and new 
policies merits attention. Third, we have not touched upon redistribution between 
different consumer groups and between producing firms (not only fuels), which 
certainly matters. Forth, we have ignored the efficiency impact of both policies in 
terms of internalization of externalities. Examining the potential trade-off between 
efficiency and redistribution would be interesting. Finally, our assumption on perfect 
power markets could be relaxed, and redistribution under market power analyzed. 
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